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1.2. OIL-PRICE VOLATILITY AND EXTERNAL RISK: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE MACROECONOMIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE  
 
 
Summary 
In an era of increased global risk and the possibility of international “contagion,” managers 
worldwide must be cognizant of the role that various types of volatility might have on their 
countries and regions. In particular, statistical analysis can provide estimates of the 
macroeconomic implications of shocks to foreign asset and commodity prices. This study 
performs such an analysis, applying time-series econometric modelling to analysis of four 
Central European countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, and Poland), as well as Russia and 
Ukraine.  
Using monthly data and applying Vector Autoregressive (VAR) time-series methods, this 
study first models oil-price volatility and real effective exchange-rate volatility. We then study 
the effects of these volatility terms and of changes in U.S. stock prices on credit growth, output 
growth, and the currency markets of our set of European countries. Overall, Granger Causality 
tests and Impulse Response Functions show that risk does have a strong impact on the region’s 
economies, but that the effects differ from country to country. For example, U.S. stock-price 
declines uniformly put pressure on the region’s currencies. At the national level, oil-price 
volatility puts pressure on the złoty (PLN) and also contributes to Polish growth, and also hurts 
Russian growth. Our findings therefore offer the region’s industries insights into their exposure 
to global risk and the global macroeconomy. 
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Introduction  
 
Following a decade of large increases and decreases on global markets, commodity 
prices began to drop significantly in 2014. While the resulting revenue losses can hurt 
emerging-market commodity exporters, oil-price declines may help lower costs and 
boost profits for manufacturers, particularly in Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
nations. At the same time, however, large swings in commodity prices create volatility 
that might be detrimental; increased risk hurts individual businesses and the overall 
macroeconomy. This paper investigates the impact of oil-price volatility on the 
exchange markets of six CEE nations, as well as interactions with macroeconomic 
variables. Using time-series methods, we find important effects that differ from 
country to country. 
This study focuses on a measure of Exchange-Market Pressure (EMP), which captures 
exchange-rate depreciations as well as central-bank measures to combat these 
depreciations. This monthly measure is then modelled as a function of U.S. stock 
prices and key macroeconomic variables. These include domestic credit growth, the 
growth rate of government borrowing, GDP growth, and inflation. Previous research, 
by Phylaktis and Ravazzolo (2005), Van Poeck et al. (2006), Stavárek (2011), 
Koseoglu and Cevik (2013) and others shows these variables to be significant 
determinates of EMP and currency crises in the CEE region. And while Hegerty (2012, 
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show whether these responses differ from zero. While the “orthogonal” VAR approach 
of Sims (1980) depends on the proper ordering of variables in the system, the 
“generalized” approach does not. In an additional analysis, we re-estimate Equation (2) 
with volatility of the REER in place of oil-price volatility, for a total of 12 separate 
estimations.  
Our Granger Causality results and Impulse Response Functions are shown below. 
Overall, we find that not only does each of the six countries in our analysis behave 
differently from one another for almost every variable, but that REER volatility and 
oil-price variability also generate surprisingly different results. 
 
Results  
 
Figure 1 shows the calculated time series of in the price of U.K. Brent and its volatility 
from 1990 to 2014. We see increases in volatility throughout the sample period, but the 
largest “spike” occurs immediately before and during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. 
At the same time, EMP increased during this period, as did real exchange-rate 
volatility for these CEE countries. Our goal is to test empirically the causes and 
interlinkages of these movements. 
 
Figure 1: Oil Prices (U. Brent) and their volatility  
 
 
Measured as the standard errors of a rolling AR(1) regression over 12-month windows. 
 
The left side of Figure 2 shows our generated EMP series. Market pressure increased 
during the 2008 crisis – note the behaviour of the złoty, for example – but this pattern 
is similar across countries. Each country has its own “idiosyncratic” behaviour as well, 
which represents it unique internal conditions (Bulgaria, for example, behaves 
differently from the others). On the right side is REER volatility. Again, there are 
“common” events, such as the 2008 crisis, as well as individual movements 
(Hungary’s stands out during 2012). 
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2014a, 2014b) examines the link between commodity price changes and EMP in Latin 
America, Russia, and the Baltics, he does not include price variability in any 
specification. This study, therefore provides a key addition to this important branch of 
the literature, providing business leaders with increased ability to understand and 
mitigate this risk. 
 
Methodology 
 
In this study, monthly data for all variables are taken from the International Financial 
Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. The timespan differs from country to 
country, but generally begins in the mid-1990s and ends in late 2014. First, we 
calculate EMP as a function of exchange-rate depreciations (an increase in the number 
of units per U.S. dollar), reserve losses (as a percentage of the lagged monetary base), 
and the change in the interest-rate differential (money-market rate) vis-à-vis the United 
States: 
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Each component is deflated by its own standard deviation. Oil-price volatility is next 
calculated as the standard error of a rolling AR(1) regression (of the price on its lagged 
value), with 12-month windows. A similar calculation is carried out with the real 
effective exchange rate (REER), which represents a country’s competitiveness versus a 
broad range of trade partners. This volatility, therefore, represents another type of 
external risk. 
After plotting these time series, we then conduct Vector Autoregressive (VAR) 
analysis to test for spillovers among variables. These allow for any variable in the 
specification to have an impact on any other; for example, EMP and growth might 
have effects on each other. We first perform a bivariate Granger Causality test between 
oil-price and REER volatility to see whether the addition of one variable to a 
regression of the other on its own lagged values increases the regression’s explanatory 
power; if so, it has a significant impact. Our main test, however, is this test’s 
multivariate version, applied to the following vector: 
  ttttttt POILVOLUSPSdINFGROWTHGOVGCRGEMP ,ln,,,,,  (2) 
 
The lag length of each VAR is chosen by minimizing the Schwarz goodness-of-fit-
criterion. In addition, we make sure that each variable in our analysis is stationary by 
performing a set of Phillips-Perron (1988) stationary tests, and taking first differences 
of any variable for which we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity. 
We therefore proceed with VARs that contain different mixes of differenced and level 
variables, all of which are stationary. Once proper VARs are estimated, significant 
Granger Causalty/Block exogeneity statistics suggest that one variable has an effect on 
the variable of interest.  
We also generate a number of Impulse-Response Functions (IRFs) following the 
Generalized VAR methodology of Pesaran and Shin (1998). These functions plot the 
time path of one variable after a shock to another, as well as significance bands to 
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results of our test, which tell us which variables need to be differenced and which do 
not, are presented in Table 1.  
EMP, for example, is always stationary without differencing, while credit growth must 
be differenced for all six countries (and would be labelled “DCRG” to reflect this 
adjustment). GDP growth must be differenced for Ukraine, but not Poland, for 
example. 
We next test for direct spillovers between volatility measures using a bivariate 
Granger-causality test. The results are provided in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Bilateral Granger causality test results (p-values in parentheses) 
 
Poland Hungary Bulgaria Croatia Russia Ukraine 
 REER  POILB 0.288 (0.599) 
3.774 
(0.054) 
0.360 
(0.549) 
2.502 
(0.116) 
0.457 
(0.500) 
3.989 
(0.048) 
 POILB  REER 6.645 (0.011) 
10.644 
(0.001) 
0.016 
(0.898) 
0.435 
(0.511) 
8.844 
(0.003) 
42.245 
(0.000) 
Bold = significant at 5 percent. Ho = the left-hand variable does not Granger-cause the right-
hand one. 
 
 
We see that in four of the six countries, increased oil-price variability spills over to the 
real effective exchange rate. In other words, oil price risk leads to risk in the “terms of 
trade,” or the competitiveness of the CEE region. Only in Ukraine is the other direction 
of causation significant at 5 percent. Perhaps world markets are sensitive to events in 
this relatively small, but highly influential country. 
Table 3 shows the main Granger causality/Block exogeneity test results. Variables are 
differenced based on stationarity tests results that are available upon request.  
 
 
Table 3: Bilateral Granger causality test results (p-values in parentheses) 
 
Poland EMP DCRG GROWTH DINF 
EMP 0.578 (0.447) 14.785 (0.000) 0.604 (0.437) 
DCRG 0.116 (0.733) 7.790 (0.005) 7.696 (0.006) 
GROWTH 0.572 (0.449) 1.349 (0.245) 6.097 (0.014) 
DINF 0.063 (0.802) 14.217 (0.000) 9.793 (0.002) 
DGOVG 1.182 (0.277) 0.156 (0.693) 2.077 (0.150) 1.227 (0.268) 
DLNUSPS 2.526 (0.112) 0.666 (0.414) 0.316 (0.574) 0.070 (0.791) 
DVOLPOILB 0.777 (0.378) 6.892 (0.009) 0.241 (0.624) 0.212 (0.645) 
All 5.138 (0.526) 25.643 (0.000) 28.004 (0.000) 18.152 (0.006) 
Hungary EMP DCRG DGROWTH DINF 
EMP 1.901 (0.168) 0.307 (0.579) 0.136 (0.712) 
DCRG 1.934 (0.164) 0.145 (0.703) 0.000 (0.993) 
DGROWTH 0.143 (0.705) 0.058 (0.810) 2.393 (0.122) 
DINF 0.035 (0.851) 3.233 (0.072) 0.38 (0.538) 
DGOVG 2.365 (0.124) 2.187 (0.139) 3.793 (0.052) 0.179 (0.673) 
DLNUSPS 1.629 (0.202) 0.252 (0.616) 0.131 (0.717) 2.881 (0.090) 
DVOLPOILB 0.410 (0.522) 0.803 (0.370) 2.489 (0.115) 0.343 (0.558) 
All 4.928 (0.553) 12.316 (0.055) 13.958 (0.030) 7.815 (0.252) 
Hegerty, S. W. 
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Figure 2: Exchange market pressure indices (left side) and REER volatility (right side) 
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(1988) stationarity test.  
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P-values in parentheses. Ho = the variable is nonstationary. 
 
Macroeconomic variables are often “nonstationary,” rising or falling over time. This 
makes traditional statistical inference difficult, so one solution is to difference the 
variables when necessary and to include only changes over time in our analysis. The 
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Figure 2: Exchange market pressure indices (left side) and REER volatility (right side) 
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macroeconomic variables (such as the linkage between inflation and credit growth and 
Poland) have important effects as well. 
These results are confirmed by our Generalized IRF results, which are presented in 
Figure 3. It is important to note that the IRFs on the far right of each column come 
from a set of separate estimations (which replace oil-price volatility with REER 
volatility). Since all but the “replacement” variables’ IRFs will be the same, to avoid 
redundancy and to conserve space, only the REERVOL IRFs are depicted. We can 
easily see the differences in response to shocks in each variable. Also, only those 
responses that are more than two standard errors from zero (using the error bands) are 
considered to be significantly positive or negative. 
Our main conclusion from the IRFs is that macroeconomic variables respond 
differently to oil-price and REER shocks. In many cases, higher U.S. stock prices 
reduce EMP (and falling prices put pressure on the region’s currencies); high stock 
prices are often beneficial to the region’s growth. While there is a vast amount of 
information in these graphs, we can focus on some key results, country by country. In 
Poland, for example, oil-price volatility raises EMP and increases credit growth, while 
REER volatility reduces credit growth. Here, we see that the two types of external 
risk—oil-price variability and REER volatility—do indeed have different effects. 
In Hungary, REER volatility reduces EMP as well as credit growth, but oil prices have 
less of an effect. Oil-price volatility increases Croatian credit growth, but REER 
volatility does not have the same effect. For Bulgaria, only limited effects are observed 
overall. Neither oil-price variability nor REER volatility generate significant impulse 
responses for any of Bulgaria’s key macroeconomic variables in our study. Perhaps 
differences in the country’s exchange-rate regime (it alone has a currency-board-type 
fixed exchange rate; others have floating currencies) might explain these differences. 
Turning to the two countries that are most closely tied to energy prices, we arrive at 
some interesting conclusions. In Russia, oil-price volatility increases EMP and reduces 
industrial production growth, confirming that recent fluctuations in global energy 
markets will help destabilize not only the ruble (RUB), but also Russia’s real 
economy. At the same time, increased REER volatility leads to higher growth, which 
demonstrates the differences in responses to these two risk measures. In Ukraine, oil-
price volatility increases credit growth, while REERVOL reduces the same 
macroeconomic variable. The hryvnia is not affected the way the ruble was in our 
analysis.  
These findings bring us to two key conclusions. First, business leaders and 
policymakers must be wary of the role that commodity-price fluctuations have on the 
macroeconomies of the countries in which they operate. But, since this role varies 
from country to country, a “one size fits all” policy is not recommended, and policies 
must therefore be tailored depending on the importance of oil prices and the impact 
that risk has on each particular economy. 
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Bulgaria EMP DCRG DGROWTH DINF 
EMP 0.557 (0.456) 3.634 (0.057) 0.336 (0.562) 
DCRG 0.830 (0.362) 0.008 (0.927) 0.456 (0.500) 
DGROWTH 0.965 (0.326) 0.494 (0.482) 0.357 (0.550) 
DINF 0.250 (0.617) 0.635 (0.425) 0.148 (0.701) 
GOVG 0.000 (0.993) 0.136 (0.712) 0.315 (0.575) 0.063 (0.802) 
DLNUSPS 6.018 (0.014) 7.991 (0.005) 0.152 (0.696) 5.156 (0.023) 
DVOLPOILB 1.051 (0.305) 0.011 (0.916) 0.003 (0.957) 0.001 (0.979) 
All 9.207 (0.162) 9.461 (0.149) 4.927 (0.553) 6.496 (0.370) 
Croatia EMP DCRG GROWTH DINF 
EMP 0.092 (0.762) 0.771 (0.380) 0.213 (0.645) 
DCRG 1.270 (0.260) 0.001 (0.974) 
GROWTH 0.449 (0.503) 0.003 (0.957) 0.608 (0.435) 
DINF 0.324 (0.569) 1.599 (0.206) 0.491 (0.484) 0.725 (0.394) 
DGOVG 1.105 (0.293) 0.048 (0.827) 0.825 (0.364) 0.475 (0.491) 
DLNUSPS 1.634 (0.201) 0.267 (0.605) 0.428 (0.513) 0.084 (0.772) 
DVOLPOILB 0.558 (0.455) 4.633 (0.031) 0.159 (0.690) 9.475 (0.002) 
All 4.423 (0.620) 9.790 (0.134) 4.492 (0.610) 11.50 (0.074) 
Russia EMP DCRG DGROWTH DINF 
EMP 1.099 (0.295) 4.986 (0.026) 0.437 (0.508) 
DCRG 0.007 (0.933) 3.484 (0.062) 0.001 (0.978) 
DGROWTH 1.794 (0.180) 2.947 (0.086) 2.585 (0.108) 
DINF 0.701 (0.402) 2.200 (0.138) 0.802 (0.371) 
DGOVG 0.332 (0.565) 1.623 (0.203) 0.090 (0.764) 0.192 (0.662) 
DLNUSPS 2.832 (0.092) 0.503 (0.478) 4.546 (0.033) 0.026 (0.871) 
DVOLPOILB 0.729 (0.393) 0.886 (0.347) 4.415 (0.036) 0.175 (0.676) 
All 5.804 (0.446) 9.916 (0.128) 25.082 (0.000) 3.105 (0.796) 
Ukraine EMP DCRG DGROWTH DINF 
EMP 1.280 (0.258) 2.023 (0.155) 0.754 (0.385) 
DCRG 2.172 (0.141) 0.040 (0.841) 1.630 (0.202) 
DGROWTH 1.340 (0.247) 9.834 (0.002) 6.294 (0.012) 
DINF 0.748 (0.387) 4.783 (0.029) 1.262 (0.261) 
GOVG 0.214 (0.644) 2.849 (0.091) 2.094 (0.148) 0.020 (0.887) 
DLNUSPS 1.152 (0.283) 0.187 (0.665) 4.785 (0.029) 3.277 (0.070) 
DVOLPOILB 0.252 (0.616) 0.036 (0.849) 0.487 (0.485) 0.172 (0.678) 
All 6.789 (0.341) 26.01 (0.000) 14.872 (0.021) 14.232 (0.027) 
 
 
Our key item of interest is the effect of oil-price volatility on EMP, credit growth, 
GDP growth (proxied by  log changes in the monthly index of industrial production), 
and CPI inflation. Our main finding is that CEE exchange markets are less affected by 
commodity-price risk than are other variables. Oil-price volatility has a significant 
impact on credit growth in Poland and Croatia and on GDP growth in Russia. U.S. 
stock-price movements significantly affect EMP growth in Poland and Croatia and 
industrial-production (GDP) growth in Russia. U.S. stock-price movements 
significantly affect EMP, credit growth, and GDP growth in Poland and Croatia, and 
GDP growth in Russia. U.S. stock-price movements significantly affect EMP, credit 
growth, and inflation in Bulgaria, and GDP growth in Russia and Ukraine. The other 
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Figure 3: Impulse-response functions (with ±2 standard error bands) 
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Figure 3: Impulse-response functions (with ±2 standard error bands) 
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Conclusion  
 
Commodity-price volatility, which has increased over the past year with the recent 
plunge in oil prices, has the potential to introduce risk into the business environment. 
In particular, CEE countries might find the costs of this risk to outweigh the benefits 
brought by high energy prices. Therefore, those who conduct business in the region 
must be aware of how risk affects each variable in the macroeconomy, and how these 
effects differ from country to country. 
This study models oil-price and real effective exchange rate (REER) risk for six CEE 
economies before using Vector Autoregressive (VAR) methods to test for spillovers 
between risk and a set of macroeconomic variables. First, a measure of Exchange 
Market Pressure (EMP) is created for each country to obtain a measure of currency 
movements and central bank interventions combined. Risk in oil prices and the REER 
is also calculated using statistical methods, and these variables are used alongside a 
number of macroeconomic variables in our empirical analysis.  
We test our hypothesis using Granger causality tests and by generating Impulse 
Response Functions. Our results show that oil-price and REER volatility have differing 
effects on our set of macroeconomic variables, and that overall the results differ from 
country to country. In general, U.S. stock price decreases put pressure on the region’s 
currencies. We find that credit growth and output growth are most affected by oil-price 
risk, but not for every country in the study. In particular, oil-price risk puts pressure on 
the złoty and leads to increased credit growth in Poland, while REER volatility has 
more of an impact on Hungary’s economy. Russia, the region’s major oil exporter, 
experiences not only pressure to depreciate, but also reduced GDP growth, when oil-
price risk increases. We conclude that differences in economic performance in the 
region are real, and that policymakers and business leaders must take these differences 
into account when planning their strategies. 
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1.3. THE ISSUE OF RESOURCE THEORY AND CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
Summary 
In this paper, the problematic issues have been undertaken with regard to the management of 
intangible resources in an enterprise. There has been an indication of the changes in an 
enterprise as the consequence of functioning in a turbulent environment. The environment 
forces the social approach of enterprises. The significance of organizational culture in the 
process of creating the social approach of enterprises has also been emphasized, while 
simultaneously acknowledging organizational culture as one of the intangible resources. In the 
further sections, models of the relations between enterprises and institutions have been 
presented, coupled with an illustration of the social approaches.  
 
Keywords: intangible resources, culture of organization, social approach of enterprises 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The functioning of enterprises requires the possession of resources. Their structure 
indicates a significant differentiation and generally speaking, the tangible resources 
and intangible resources are distinctive. In the resource theory, the focus is being 
increasingly moved from the tangible resources to the intangible resources. In this 
group of resources the competitive potential of an enterprise functioning on a global 
market is perceived. The intangible resources are termed as a catalyser for the 
activation of the tangible resources. In terms of the intangible resources their 
usefulness is illustrated. Of all the varied forms, the usefulness of intangible resources 
evolves in the direction of creating the social approaches of enterprises. In the sphere 
of the issues of the social approaches of enterprises, there is an indication of 
organizational culture in terms of ontological, semantic and nomological notions. 
Organizational culture has been included in the organizational creation, constituting a 
base for the strategies of enterprises. The differentiation of the forms of organizational 
activity has become the basis of the generalization presented in business models. The 
social basis of enterprises has been taken into consideration as an element of the 
intangible resources. 
 
Processes of changes in management of intangible resources 
 
In the process of the functioning of enterprises, there is an indication of change as an 
intrinsic element of the activities of an organization. Their very nature and scope 
indicates great differentiation, while Krzakiewicz claims that the contemporary world 
of business favours those organizations that may display that their activities are tried 
and trusted and may appraise its activities in a rational way. Selection within the 
framework of the organizational populations usually eliminates organizations of a low 
reliability and a lack of social responsibility (Krzakiewicz, 2014) By way of 
continuing deliberations in this sphere of change, it is possible to refer to the premise 
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